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1 Introduction
Since its adoption in 2001 by NIST (National Institute of Standards and Technology) as the U.S. national
standard for encrypting sensitive data, the Advanced Encryption Standard (also known as AES or Rijndael)
cipher has become one of the most popular and widely used encryption ciphers worldwide. While no practically
exploitable weaknesses have yet been shown to exist in the AES, the relatively algebraically simple description
of the algorithm leads some cryptographers to theorize the existence of an algebraic weakness in the cipher.
As a result, experimental algebraic cryptanalysis of the AES has become a topic of great interest in the
cryptography community, as the discovery of an algebraic weakness would be devastating to the cipher’s
security. At the core of this search for potential algebraic weaknesses lies the tool that is an algebraic
representation of the AES. An algebraic representation of the cipher is a system of mathematical equations
which model the cipher’s behavior and therefore can be used by researchers as a tool to study the algebraic
properties of the cipher in a more mathematical environment. Despite being one of the primary tools of
an algebraic cryptanalyst of the AES though, many algebraic representations are impractical by design. In
particular, a fully generalized representation is usually far too cumbersome to work with by hand, while a
more simplified representation is easier to work with but incurs a loss of subtle, yet crucial information about
the algebraic properties of the AES which would otherwise be provided by a fully generalized representation.
The purpose of this project was to develop a tool to solve this challenge and allow researchers to work with
a powerful and descriptive algebraic representation of the AES in a simple environment. This was done by
providing a fully generalized algebraic representation of the AES in the mathematical software system Sage.
Sage is a computational tool used by mathematicians, researchers, and students, and it provides a powerful
environment and collection of tools for working with complex mathematical systems. By implementing a
generalized representation in Sage, I aimed to provide this representation in an environment where users
can utilize the powerful and useful tools provided by Sage as well as bypass the traditional difficulties of
working with a fully generalized representation by allowing Sage to abstract the more challenging aspects of
the representation and perform the more difficult work automatically. This allows researchers of the AES to
maximize the utility of a generalized representation in a concise and efficient manner, making this project a
valuable addition to Sage and to the cryptography community.
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2 Description of the AES
For readers unfamiliar with the details of the AES, I provide a brief description of the cipher here which covers
the basic details necessary for understanding how we construct a fully generalized algebraic representation
later on. For a complete description of the cipher, I recommend Chapter 3 of [1].
The AES (also known as the Rijndael cipher) is a block cipher operating on matrix blocks with 8-bit
entries of size 4 × Nb, where 4 ≤ Nb ≤ 8 is the block length. It is a symmetric key cipher and requires a
4 × Nk block as a key for encryption and decryption, where 4 ≤ Nk ≤ 8 is the key length. To encrypt and
decrypt data, the AES uses a substitution-permutation network to transform each block by passing each block
through the specially designed AES round function a certain number of times. Depending on the block length
Nb and the key length Nk, the AES determines the number of rounds, Nr, to apply by using the chart below:
Nk
4 5 6 7 8
4 10 11 12 13 14
5 11 11 12 13 14
Nb 6 12 12 12 13 14
7 13 13 13 13 14
8 14 14 14 14 14
Each round of the AES consists of the below four steps, except for the final round which omits the
MixColumns step to make the structure of the encryption algorithm and the decryption algorithm identical:
1. SubBytes
2. ShiftRows
3. MixColumns
4. AddRoundKey
These four steps are known as the round component functions, and all except AddRoundKey operate on
a single input block. To perform its functionality, AddRoundKey additionally requires a 4 × Nb round key
block, one of which is generated for each round from the original key via a separate KeySchedule function.
To maintain consistency in notation though, I will write AddRoundKey(A) to denote the function’s operation
on the arbitrary block A and unless said elsewhere, I will be intentionally ambiguous about which round key
is used as it is typically unimportant.
During encryption, the byte entries of a block are sometimes interpreted as belonging to the finite field:
F =
GF (2)[x]
x8 + x4 + x3 + x+ 1
Each arbitrary byte (b7b6b5b4b3b2b1b0) is described as corresponding to the below element in F :
x7 · b7 + x6 · b6 + x5 · b5 + x4 · b4 + x3 · b3 + x2 · b2 + x1 · b1 + x0 · b0
Because byte strings and the elements of F are easily interchangeable, I will typically represent the elements
of F by their corresponding hex string representations. For example, the byte string 6F corresponds to the
element x6 + x5 + x3 + x2 + x1 + x0 of F and vice versa.
Below I describe the specific details of each of the four round component functions and their inverses:
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2.1 SubBytes
SubBytes is a non-linear substitution transformation operating on each entry of a block individually. To
transform each entry of a block, SubBytes first takes that element’s inverse in F (mapping the element 0 to
itself), then transforms the result by an affine transformation over GF (2)8. To be exact:
SubBytes(A)i,j =

1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0
0 1 1 1 1 1 0 0
0 0 1 1 1 1 1 0
0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1
1 0 0 0 1 1 1 1
1 1 0 0 0 1 1 1
1 1 1 0 0 0 1 1
1 1 1 1 0 0 0 1

× (Ai,j)254+

0
1
1
0
0
0
1
1

The inverse transformation SubBytes−1 is represented by the below transformation:
SubBytes−1(A)i,j =


0 1 0 1 0 0 1 0
0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1
1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0
0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0
0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1
1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0
0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1
1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0

× Ai,j +

0
0
0
0
0
1
0
1


254
2.2 ShiftRows
ShiftRows operates on a block by cyclically shifting each row of the block a certain number of columns to
the left. Given a block length Nb, the number of columns each row Ri is shifted by is found below:
Nb R0 R1 R2 R3
4 0 1 2 3
5 0 1 2 3
6 0 1 2 3
7 0 1 2 4
8 0 1 3 4
The inverse transformation simply shifts the rows to the right the correct number of columns.
2.3 MixColumns
MixColumns operates on a block by interpreting each column [A0,i, A1,i, A2,i, A3,i] of the block as the poly-
nomial y3 ·A0,i + y2 ·A1,i + y1 ·A2,i + y0 ·A3,i from the polynomial ring F [y], then multiplying the resulting
polynomial by the fixed polynomial c(y) = 03·y3+01·y2+01·y1+02 modulo (y4 + 1).
The inverse transformation MixColumns−1 acts similarly to the normal transformation except that the
transformation instead multiplies polynomials by the fixed polynomial d(y) = 0B·y3+OD·y2+09·y1+0E mod-
ulo (y4 + 1).
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2.4 AddRoundKey
AddRoundKey is the simple entry-wise XORing of the current block matrix with the round key generated for
the current round. Because the XOR operation is its own inverse, AddRoundKey is also its own inverse.
3 Constructing the Algebraic Representation
When I set out to construct an algebraic representation of the AES, I aimed to be able to build a system of
algebraic equations which behaved analogously to the whole cipher. The system of equations I constructed
to build this algebraic representation follows the below form:
If C is a function operating on blocks which corresponds to the whole cipher function or just a component
of it, then each entry of the output matrix C(A)i,j can be represented as a polynomial over F with variables
being the entries of the generic input block A. Some polynomials of this form will additionally include variables
which are round key entries. Because the KeySchedule generates the round keys from the entries of the
original key block K, it is possible to represent each round key entry as a polynomial over F with variables
being the entries of K. Hence, one possible representation of the whole cipher constructs polynomials equaling
C(A)i,j with variables being the entries of the generic block A and the key block K. However, many forms of
cryptanalysis are based on the assumption that round keys are independent and have no relation to the original
key. To prevent excluding this generalized representation from being used in those forms of cryptanalysis, I
decided to make the key entries of the polynomial C(A)i,j come from the entries of Nr independent round
keys, which are denoted as K(1),K(2), ...,K(Nr).
Using this representation, the whole cipher becomes represented in the form of 4 ·Nb polynomials over F .
In particular, these polynomials belong to the polynomial ring:
F [A0,0, A0,1, ..., A0,Nb , A1,0, ..., A3,Nb ,K
(0)
0,0 ,K
(0)
0,1 , ...,K
(0)
0,Nk
,K
(0)
1,0 ,K
(r)
3,3 ]
where A is a generic input block and K
(r)
i,j is the i, jth entry of the rth generic round key.
To be able to construct these 4 ·Nb polynomials corresponding to arbitrary components of the cipher we
must first be able to construct them for each of the four round component functions which make up a single
round. Once we can construct these, we can link these polynomials together in order to build polynomials
corresponding to more complex aspects of the cipher. Below I describe how the algebraic representation for
each round component function was derived:
4 The Algebraic Representations of Round Component Functions
4.1 SubBytes
Let a be the function over F which corresponds to the inversion step of SubBytes and let b be the function
over GF (2)8 which corresponds to the affine transformation step of SubBytes. Building a polynomial
representation of a is trivial, simply being a(A)i,j = (Ai,j)
254, since this maps each element to its inverse
and maps 0 to 0. Building a polynomial representation of b is more difficult however, as we must construct
a polynomial over F which behaves identically under evaluation to an affine transformation over GF (2)8. A
straightforward solution to this is to use Lagrangian interpolation to build this polynomial. Following this
method, if we let F = {x0, x1, ..., x255} be an indexing of the elements of F and let V : F → GF (2)8 be a field
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isomorphism from F to GF (2)8, then a polynomial p over F which under evaluation behaves identically to b
can be found as such:
p(α) =
255∑
i=0
b(V (xi)) · li(xi),∀α ∈ F
li(α) =
255∏
j=0
j 6=i
α− xj
xi − xj =
α− x0
xi − x0 ...
α− xi−1
xi − xj−1 ·
α− xi+1
xi − xj+1 ...
α− x255
xi − x255 ,∀α ∈ F
This method works because each function li has the behavior that:
li(xk) =
1 if i = k0 if i 6= k
meaning that p(xk) = b(V (x0)) · 0 + ...+ b(V (xk−1)) · 0 + b(V (xk)) · 1 + b(V (xk+1)) · 0 + ...+ 0, making p
the polynomial we are interested in.
However, while researching how to calculate this polynomial I encountered a much more elegant and
efficient method to calculate p, which is important if we ever wish to expand the generalization of this tool
in the future to other ciphers or other forms of the AES. As some preliminaries, this method requires an
understanding of the field trace function and of dual bases of finite fields, which I informally describe here.
For readers interested in a more in-depth discussion of this subject, I recommend Appendix A of [1].
The trace function is defined as Tr : GF (pn) → GF (p), T r(x) =
n−1∑
i=0
xp
i
. It is not difficult to prove that
the trace function is linear over GF (p), that is:
Tr(x+ y) = Tr(x) + Tr(y),∀x, y ∈ GF (pn)
Tr(ax) = aTr(x), ∀a ∈ GF (p), ∀x ∈ GF (pn)
For the second definition, we remind the reader that since GF (pn) ∼= GF (p)n, we can represent the
elements of GF (pn) as n-dimensional vectors over GF (p) and that we can pick a basis of this vector space to
be e = [e0, e1, ..., en−1] where ei ∈ GF (pn), 0 ≤ i ≤ n − 1. Using this basis, we can represent each element a
in GF (pn) as a =
n−1∑
i=0
aiei where ai ∈ GF (p), 0 ≤ i ≤ n− 1 and [a0, a1, ..., an−1] are the coordinates of a as a
vector. Given the basis e, the dual basis of e is defined to be the basis d = [d0, d1, ..., dn−1] such that for all
0 ≤ i, j ≤ n − 1, Tr(diej) = δ(i, j), where δ is the Kronecker delta function. The dual basis’ primary utility
comes from the below expression, which is derived easily since the trace function is linear over GF (p):
Tr(dja) = Tr
(
dj
n−1∑
i=0
aiei
)
=
n−1∑
i=0
aiTr(djei) = aj
Using the dual basis and the trace function we can easily calculate a polynomial p over F which behaves
identically to the affine transformation b. To do this, let M be the 8×8 matrix used in the affine transformation
b. Then, letting b′ = M · α where α ∈ GF (2)8:
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b′ =
7∑
i=0
b′iei (1)
and
b′i =
7∑
j=0
Mi,jαj
=
 7∑
j=0
Mi,jTr(αdj)
+ c
=
7∑
j=0
Mi,j
7∑
t=0
αp
t
dp
t
j (2)
Substituting (2) into (1), we arrive at:
b′ =
7∑
i=0
7∑
j=0
Mi,j
7∑
t=0
αp
t
dp
t
j ei
=
7∑
t=0
 7∑
i=0
7∑
j=0
Mi,jd
pt
j ei
αpt
which gives the final result:
b =
7∑
t=0
 7∑
i=0
7∑
j=0
Mi,jd
pt
j ei
αpt + c
where c is the added constant of the affine transformation. This method of calculating a polynomial
corresponding to b is not only in some aspects simpler than the method involving Lagrangian interpolation,
but it is also much more efficient, especially when using large fields. Because I hope this project can grow
to involve other ciphers and other forms of AES which may involve much larger fields in the future, it is
important that I provide this efficient method of creating these polynomials in my implementation. For this
reason, I opted to use this algorithm to calculate the polynomial corresponding to the affine transformation
step of SubBytes.
Using this algorithm, I found the polynomial corresponding to the affine transformation step of SubBytes
to be:
p(α) = 05 ·α+ 09 ·α2+ F9 ·α4+25 ·α8+
F4 ·α16+ 01 ·α32+ B5 ·α64 8F ·α128+ 63
Combining this with the inversion step of SubBytes gives:
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SubBytes(A)i,j = 05 · (Ai,j)254 + 09 · (Ai,j)253 + F9 · (Ai,j)251+
25 · (Ai,j)247 + F4 · (Ai,j)239 + 01 · (Ai,j)223+
B5 · (Ai,j)191 + 8F · (Ai,j)127 + 63
I then used the algorithm once more to calculate the polynomial corresponding to SubBytes−1 to be:
SubBytes−1(A)i,j = (05 · (Ai,j) + FE · (Ai,j)2 + 7F · (Ai,j)4+
5A · (Ai,j)8 + 78 · (Ai,j)16 + 59 · (Ai,j)32+
DB · (Ai,j)64 + 8F · (Ai,j)128 + 05)255
4.2 ShiftRows
Compared to SubBytes, ShiftRows has a far simpler algebraic representation. Recall that the offset each
row is shifted by is determined by the below chart:
Nb R0 R1 R2 R3
4 0 1 2 3
5 0 1 2 3
6 0 1 2 3
7 0 1 2 4
8 0 1 3 4
Using this chart, it is extraordinarily simple to derive the algebraic representation of ShiftRows to be:
ShiftRows(A)i,j = Ai,(j−Ri)modNb
ShiftRows−1(A)i,j = Ai,(j+Ri)modNb
4.3 MixColumns
While the description of MixColumns might already seem to be fairly algebraic in nature, its description does
not properly fit into the form of algebraic representation I decided upon for this implementation. Hence, to
build an algebraic representation of MixColumns I show here how to represent it as a matrix transformation
and then use this matrix to construct the equations in the algebraic representation. Recall that MixColumns
transforms each column [Ai,0, Ai,1, Ai,2, Ai,3] of a block into the column [Bi,0, Bi,1, Bi,2, Bi,3] with the following
transformation over the polynomial ring F [α]:
Bi,0 · α0 +Bi,1 · α1 +Bi,2 · α2 +Bi,3 · α3 =
(Ai,0 · α0 +Ai,1 · α1 +Ai,2 · α2 +Ai,3 · α3) · (02 · α0 + 01 · α1 + 01 · α2 + 03 · α3)(modα4 + 1)
Multiplying this product out and sorting according to the resulting powers of α, this is equivalent to:
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
Bi,0
Bi,1
Bi,2
Bi,3
 =

02 03 01 01
01 02 03 01
01 01 02 03
03 01 01 02
×

Ai,0
Ai,1
Ai,2
Ai,3

Using this matrix, I constructed the algebraic representation of Mixcolumns to be:
MixColumns(A)i,j =

A0,j ·02+A1,j ·03+A2,j ·01+A3,j ·01 if i = 0
A0,j ·01+A1,j ·02+A2,j ·03+A3,j ·01 if i = 1
A0,j ·01+A1,j ·01+A2,j ·02+A3,j ·03 if i = 2
A0,j ·03+A1,j ·01+A2,j ·01+A3,j ·02 if i = 3
4.4 AddRoundKey
Of all the round component functions, AddRoundKey has the simplest algebraic representation. AddRoundKey
is simply the entry-wise XORing of the generic block matrix A and the arbitrary generic round key K(r) and
because XORing is simply addition in F , therefore:
AddRoundKey(A)i,j = Ai,j +K
(r)
i,j
Additionally, F has characteristic 2, making AddRoundKey its own inverse transformation. Hence, the
algebraic representation of AddRoundKey−1 is the same as above.
5 Composing these Algebraic Representations
With the algebraic representations of each of the round component functions constructed, all that remains
is to construct a means of composing these representations. In particular, for any two functions f and g for
which we have algebraic representations for, we must be able to construct an algebraic representation for g◦f .
The algorithm I used to perform this follows as such:
1. Suppose f and g are functions with known algebraic representations and that we wish to find a polyno-
mial equaling g(f(A))i,j for an arbitrary input block A, where 0 ≤ i ≤ Nb and 0 ≤ j ≤ 4.
2. Calculate
g(A)i,j = A0,0 · a0,0 + ...+A0,Nb · a0,Nb +A1,0 · a1,0 + ...+A3,Nb · a3,Nb+
K
(0)
0,0 · k(0)0,0 + ...+K(Nr)3,Nb · k
(Nr)
3,Nb
where ai,j , k
(r)
i,j ∈ F for all 1 ≤ i ≤ 4, 1 ≤ j ≤ Nb, and 1 ≤ r ≤ Nr.
3. Replace each Ai,j in the above equation with f(A)i,j , giving the result:
g(f(A))i,j = f(A)0,0 · a0,0 + ...+ f(A)0,Nb · a0,Nb + f(A)1,0 · a1,0 + ...+ f(A)3,Nb · a3,Nb+
K
(r)
0,0 · k(0)0,0 + ...+K(Nr)3,Nb · k
(Nr)
3,Nb
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Note that because the round key entries are constant in AES, we do not replace the K
(r)
i,j values in the
expression with f(K(r))i,j .
Using this algorithm, we can easily compose the algebraic representations of each of the round component
functions in any order to create an algebraic representation for the whole cipher or for just a component of it.
6 Implementation Details
The second step of this project involves implementing the algorithms which calculate these algebraic represen-
tations into Sage, as well as implementing the algorithm for composing representations and other algorithms
for polynomial evaluation. Sage is built on top of the programming language Python and so to do this I
made a Python class known as RijndaelGF, since my representation is closely related to the more generic
version of AES known as Rijndael-GF. This class embodies all the tools and algorithms necessary for working
with algebraic representations of AES by being constructible as a RijndaelGF object which then provides
various methods for accessing these tools. Additionally, I added the functionality of being able to perform
full encryptions and decryptions with a RijndaelGF object as a demonstration of the implementation’s
correctness.
6.1 RijndaelGF.Round Component Poly Constr
Since for a function f , the algebraic representation of f simply means that we can create a polynomial
equaling f(A)i,j in terms of the entries of A, it makes some sense to implement this functionality as a
method of RijndaelGF. However, there are two issues caused by this. First, this would either force users to
construct their own functions for building algebraic representations corresponding to composed functions, or
the implementation would have to automatically build these functions. The first choice is problematic in that
we are forcing the user to perform an action much better suited for Sage to automatically perform, while the
second is problematic because such a created function reveals no information about its intended purpose and
can be vague and difficult to use. Additionally, we should be able to work with the algebraic representation
of a particular function in the same manner as with the algebraic representations of other functions. This is
impossible to enforce if we implement this functionality as a method, whereas if we construct an object which
embodies an algebraic representation we can enforce this much more easily.
For these reasons, I chose to embody the algebraic representations of functions with my own class
called Round Component Poly Constr. Objects of this class can be used to construct polynomials from
the algebraic representations of a function by invoking the call() method. To be exact, if f is the
Round Component Poly Constr object corresponding to the function f , then we can calculate the polyno-
mial f(A)i,j by simply calling f(i,j). To provide the basics for working with representations of components
of the cipher, I added a Round Component Poly Constr object to the RijndaelGF class for each round
component function. Additionally, this class is not restricted to just the round component functions, despite
the name. As is described in the section below, one can use the compose(f,g) method in order to create new
Round Component Poly Constr objects corresponding to the composition of multiple functions. Alterna-
tively, users can create their own method of the form f poly constr(i,j) which implements the algebraic
representation for some other function f and returns f(A)i,j and pass this method to the class constructor as
Round Component Poly Constr(f poly constr) in order to create a Round Component Poly Constr
corresponding to the function f .
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6.2 RijndaelGF.compose(f,g)
In order to build Round Component Poly Constr objects corresponding to the composition of multiple
functions, we require a compose(f,g) method. For reasons which will soon become obvious, I decided
to implement the compose(f,g) method to have two distinct functionalities. First, if both f and g
are Round Component Poly Constr objects corresponding to the functions f and g respectively, then
compose(f,g) will return a new Round Component Poly Constr object corresponding to the func-
tion g ◦ f . Second, if the argument f is a Round Component Poly Constr object corresponding to the
function f and the argument g is the polynomial g(A)i,j , then compose(f,g) returns the polynomial
g(f(A))i,j . The reason for these two functionalities is that the first functionality is used for creation of
new Round Component Poly Constr objects while the second functionality is what actually creates the
polynomials for the objects created by the first functionality. It is because these two functionalities are so
tightly linked that I decided to have compose perform both these functionalities rather than creating separate
methods.
My implementation of compose(f,g) is described in the below pseudocode. Note that the first case is
an implementation of the algorithm described in Section 5.
de f compose ( f , g ) :
i f i s p o l y n o m i a l ( g ) :
f v a l s = [ f ( i , j ) f o r i in range (4 ) f o r j in range (Nb ) ]
r e turn g . e v a l u a t e v a r i a b l e s ( f v a l s )
e l s e :
go f = lambda i , j : r e turn compose ( f , g ( i , j ) )
r e turn new Round Component Poly Constr ( go f )
A particularly useful feature of this implementation of compose is that the actual calculation of polynomi-
als is delayed when creating new Round Component Poly Constr objects. This makes the computational
cost of creating a Round Component Poly Constr object corresponding to many composed functions triv-
ial, as it delays polynomial calculations until the user explicitly requests it.
6.3 Additional Details of the Implementation
Using the provided Round Component Poly Constr objects and the compose method of the RijndaelGF
class, it is now possible to use this implementation to create and interact with a fully generalized algebraic
representation of the entire cipher as well as representations of smaller components of the cipher. While my
primary goal for this project was accomplished at this point, I recognized that the RijndaelGF class required
various other components to be implemented in order to make the constructed algebraic representations easier
to work with and more powerful. I describe some of the more important components here.
Currently, while a user is able to construct algebraic representations corresponding to any imaginable
component of the cipher, a created Round Component Poly Constr object cannot be used outside a purely
theoretical application. In order to allow users to use these objects in a practical manner, I added the method
RijndaelGF.apply poly(state, poly constr). This method accepts two arguments: a block matrix
called state, and a Round Component Poly Constr object called poly constr, and this method returns
a new block matrix where each i, jth entry of the matrix equals the polynomial poly constr(i,j) evaluated
by setting its variables equal to the entries of state. In short, if poly constr corresponds to the function
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f , then apply poly(state, poly constr) returns f(state). This allows users to construct algebraic
representations corresponding to certain functions, then be able to pass block matrices through these functions
without ever having to explicitly define the function beyond its algebraic representation. In addition, the
argument state can be a generic state matrix, meaning that poly constr(state) returns a matrix of
polynomials which describes the entire algebraic representation. This gives us a succinct way to generate a
complete description of an algebraic representation of a function. Finally, this method makes it easy to add
the functionality of the round component functions to the RijndaelGF class, as is shown in below example:
de f sub bytes ( s e l f , s t a t e ) :
r e turn s e l f . app ly po ly ( s ta te , s e l f . s u b b y t e s p o l y c o n s t r ( ) )
The second addition I added to this implementation deals with key variables. Previously, I pointed out that
because the round key entries are generated from the original key, it is therefore possible to express all round
key entries as polynomials with variables being the entries of the original key. As many forms of cryptanalysis
assume round key entries to be independent however, I decided to have this implementation use independent
round key entries by default. In order to preserve the functionality of representing round key entries in terms of
the original key though, I added an expand key poly(row, col, round) method to the RijndaelGF
class to do this. When called, expand key poly(row, col, round) returns a polynomial composed of
entries of the original key which equals the rowth, colth entry of the roundth round key. Although I have
not described the details of how the KeySchedule generates round keys in this paper, this method simply
backtracks through the KeySchedule algorithm to arrive at the answer.
The final important addition I added to this implementation includes various methods which allow the
user to perform full encryptions and decryptions. This functionality is built through repeated application of
the apply poly method with the built-in Round Component Poly Constr objects for each of the round
component functions. There are two benefits to implementing this functionality: first, we can input the official
AES testing vectors and prove the correctness of this implementation. Second, since apply poly accepts
generic block matrices as input and since the method encrypt is built upon this method, we can simply
call encrypt(generic block, generic key) to get a block matrix whose every entry is a polynomial
representing the application of the entire cipher. While this is likely too computationally intensive to ever
be practically useful, it acts as a practical example of how the structure of this implementation allows us to
perform these powerful operations by reusing other aspects of the implementation.
7 Conclusion
By adding this implementation to Sage, I have successfully completed my goal of providing users the ability
to generate a fully generalized algebraic representation of the whole AES cipher and its subcomponents in
a simple and powerful mathematical computing environment. Additionally, I have allowed room for this
project to grow to include representations of other variants of the AES by making the representation as
generalized as possible as well as allowing this representation’s internal behavior to be modified to fit these
other representations. Furthermore, I have structured this implementation such that it is not only a useful
tool in itself but that it also establishes a framework which can be used as a general model for implementing
the algebraic representations of other ciphers and algorithms in Sage. For these reasons, I believe the result
of this project is both a powerful and useful tool for algebraic cryptanalysts and researchers of the AES as
well as a valuable contribution to Sage and its cryptographic libraries.
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